Value and justification : the foundations of liberal theory

This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of simply maximising one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality.

Preface	p. xiii
I The Nature of the Theories	p. 1
1 The theory of value	p. 1
1.1. Some basic features of the concept of value	p. 1
1.2. Theories of concepts	p. 4
1.3. Grounds for accepting the theory	p. 10
2 Moral justification	p. 13
2.1. Morality and value	p. 13
2.2. Public justification	p. 15
2.3. Contractualism	p. 18
2.4. Remarks on the task of moral theory	p. 19
Part I. A Theory of Value	p. 23
II Emotion	p. 25
3 Two theories of emotion	p. 26
3.1. The Internal Sensation Theory	p. 26
3.2. The Cognitive-Arousal Theory	p. 33
3.3. Three versions of CAT	p. 34
4 Affects	p. 41
4.1. Some evidence for discrete affects	p. 41
4.2. Some objections and additional evidence	p. 45
5 Affects and objects	p. 49
5.1. Intentional objects	p. 49
5.2. The content of emotional states	p. 51
5.3. Items in the world	p. 56
5.4. Grounding beliefs	p. 57
6 Appropriateness conditions	p. 64
6.1. Appropriate beliefs and objects	p. 64
6.2. Emotions and evaluations	p. 69
6.3. Stronger appropriateness conditions	p. 74
III Valuing	p. 80
7 What valuing presupposes	p. 81
7.1. The affect presupposition	p. 81
7.2. Desire presuppositions	p. 84
7.3. Needs presuppositions	p. 101
8 Intrinsic valuing	p. 105
8.1. Hedonism and the Affective-Cognitive Theory	p. 105
8.2. Affects and attitudes	p. 112
8.3. Beliefs about goodness	p. 118
8.4. Unworthy emotions and their objects	p. 124
9 Extrinsic valuing and rational action	p. 126
9.1. Intrinsic and instrumental valuing	p. 126
9.2. Purely derivative valuings	p. 130
9.3. Foundational valuings	p. 140
IV Value Judgments	p. 145
10 Simple value judgments	p. 146
10.1. The color analogy	p. 146
10.2. Externalism and internalism in value theory	p. 153
10.3. Impersonal value judgments and action	p. 161
10.4. How value judgments can be criticized	p. 165
10.5. Extrinsic value judgments	p. 172
11 Comparative value judgments	p. 173
11.1. Comparative valuings	p. 175
11.2. Are there impersonal comparative value judgments?	p. 185
12 Reasons and objectivity	p. 190
12.1. Objectivity as impartiality	p. 190
12.2. Objectivity as decentering	p. 198
V Values and Value Systems	p. 204
13 Values	p. 204
13.1. Abstract valuings	p. 205
13.2. Valuational criteria	p. 207
13.3. Value orientations	p. 217
14 Value systems	p. 219
14.1. Ambivalence and conflict	p. 219
14.2. The coherence of value systems	p. 223
14.3. Values, goods, and plans	p. 235
15 Conclusion to part I	p. 241
15.1 The Affective-Cognitive Theory: revisions and retentions	p. 241
15.2. The open-question argument	p. 244
15.3. Anthropocentrism and the environment	p. 247
Part II. A Theory of Moral Justification	p. 251
VI Value and Moral Reasons	p. 253
16 Two radical theories	p. 253
16.1. The orthodox view	p. 253
16.2. Simple Rationalism	p. 261
17 Value-grounded rationalism (i)	p. 269
17.1. VGR and its paradox	p. 269
17.2. Solipsism and egocentrism	p. 275
17.3. Minimal objectivity	p. 278
17.4. Psychopathy	p. 292
17.5. Moral personality, habit, and reason	p. 300
18 Value-grounded rationalism (ii)	p. 306
18.1. Consistency and universalizability	p. 306
18.2. The first objection: consistency as a value	p. 313
18.3. The second objection: the gap between belief and action	p. 315
18.4. The third objection: the instrumental interpretation	p. 316
VII Teleological and Deontological Justification	p. 319
19 Public justification	p. 319
19.1. Moral personality and justification	p. 319
19.2. Public morality and justification	p. 322
19.3. Contractualism	p. 328
20 Constrained teleology	p. 329
20.1. Contractualism and teleology	p. 329
20.2. The common good	p. 334
21 Common good arguments	p. 336
21.1. Community of valuing	p. 337
21.2. Harmony	p. 339
21.3. Compromise	p. 343
21.4. Proceduralism	p. 351
21.5. Neutrality and common good arguments	p. 356
22 Value and deontology	p. 359
22.1. The problem of circularity	p. 359
22.2. Deontological public justification	p. 362
22.3. The rational commitment to both forms of justification	p. 365
23 Two remaining issues	p. 367
23.1. The boundary of the public	p. 367
23.2. Moral value	p. 376
VIII The State of Nature	p. 379
24 The right to natural liberty	p. 379
24.1. Deontology and the state of nature	p. 379
24.2. The justification of natural liberty	p. 381
24.3. Two objections	p. 386
24.4. On interpreting "liberty"	p. 390
25 Paternalism	p. 396
25.1. Paternalism and liberty	p. 396
25.2. Is paternalism always justified?	p. 399
26 On further describing the state of nature	p. 404
26.1. Moral and political philosophy	p. 404
26.2. Property	p. 407
26.3. Exchange	p. 416
26.4. Harm	p. 420
26.5. Needs	p. 423
IX The Social Contract	p. 429
27 The state of nature and the social contract	p. 429
27.1. Irrational values	p. 429
27.2. Immoral proposals	p. 431
27.3. The state of nature as a baseline	p. 437
28 Ideology and compromise	p. 439
28.1. Competing ideologies	p. 439
28.2. The contractual argument in one-dimensional political space	p. 443
28.3. The N-dimensional contractual argument	p. 457
28.4. Equal liberty and antiliberal ideologies	p. 466
28.5. Distributive justice	p. 470
29 Concluding remarks	p. 476
29.1. A prolegomenon to political philosophy	p. 476
29.2. The limits of justification	p. 478
29.3. Morality and value in a liberal society	p. 480
Appendix A Izard's Des Categories and Some Reliability Statistics	p. 484
Appendix B Desert and Value	p. 485
Bibliography	p. 490
Index	p. 517

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