Cover image for Value and justification : the foundations of liberal theory
Title:
Value and justification : the foundations of liberal theory
Author:
Gaus, Gerald F.
ISBN:
9780521375252

9780521397339
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Publication Information:
Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Physical Description:
xviii, 540 p. ; 23 cm.
Series:
Cambridge studies in philosophy
Series Title:
Cambridge studies in philosophy
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Book BILKUTUP0235753 BD232 .G38 1990 Central Campus Library
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Summary

Summary

This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of simply maximising one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality.


Table of Contents

Prefacep. xiii
I The Nature of the Theoriesp. 1
1 The theory of valuep. 1
1.1. Some basic features of the concept of valuep. 1
1.2. Theories of conceptsp. 4
1.3. Grounds for accepting the theoryp. 10
2 Moral justificationp. 13
2.1. Morality and valuep. 13
2.2. Public justificationp. 15
2.3. Contractualismp. 18
2.4. Remarks on the task of moral theoryp. 19
Part I. A Theory of Valuep. 23
II Emotionp. 25
3 Two theories of emotionp. 26
3.1. The Internal Sensation Theoryp. 26
3.2. The Cognitive-Arousal Theoryp. 33
3.3. Three versions of CATp. 34
4 Affectsp. 41
4.1. Some evidence for discrete affectsp. 41
4.2. Some objections and additional evidencep. 45
5 Affects and objectsp. 49
5.1. Intentional objectsp. 49
5.2. The content of emotional statesp. 51
5.3. Items in the worldp. 56
5.4. Grounding beliefsp. 57
6 Appropriateness conditionsp. 64
6.1. Appropriate beliefs and objectsp. 64
6.2. Emotions and evaluationsp. 69
6.3. Stronger appropriateness conditionsp. 74
III Valuingp. 80
7 What valuing presupposesp. 81
7.1. The affect presuppositionp. 81
7.2. Desire presuppositionsp. 84
7.3. Needs presuppositionsp. 101
8 Intrinsic valuingp. 105
8.1. Hedonism and the Affective-Cognitive Theoryp. 105
8.2. Affects and attitudesp. 112
8.3. Beliefs about goodnessp. 118
8.4. Unworthy emotions and their objectsp. 124
9 Extrinsic valuing and rational actionp. 126
9.1. Intrinsic and instrumental valuingp. 126
9.2. Purely derivative valuingsp. 130
9.3. Foundational valuingsp. 140
IV Value Judgmentsp. 145
10 Simple value judgmentsp. 146
10.1. The color analogyp. 146
10.2. Externalism and internalism in value theoryp. 153
10.3. Impersonal value judgments and actionp. 161
10.4. How value judgments can be criticizedp. 165
10.5. Extrinsic value judgmentsp. 172
11 Comparative value judgmentsp. 173
11.1. Comparative valuingsp. 175
11.2. Are there impersonal comparative value judgments?p. 185
12 Reasons and objectivityp. 190
12.1. Objectivity as impartialityp. 190
12.2. Objectivity as decenteringp. 198
V Values and Value Systemsp. 204
13 Valuesp. 204
13.1. Abstract valuingsp. 205
13.2. Valuational criteriap. 207
13.3. Value orientationsp. 217
14 Value systemsp. 219
14.1. Ambivalence and conflictp. 219
14.2. The coherence of value systemsp. 223
14.3. Values, goods, and plansp. 235
15 Conclusion to part Ip. 241
15.1 The Affective-Cognitive Theory: revisions and retentionsp. 241
15.2. The open-question argumentp. 244
15.3. Anthropocentrism and the environmentp. 247
Part II. A Theory of Moral Justificationp. 251
VI Value and Moral Reasonsp. 253
16 Two radical theoriesp. 253
16.1. The orthodox viewp. 253
16.2. Simple Rationalismp. 261
17 Value-grounded rationalism (i)p. 269
17.1. VGR and its paradoxp. 269
17.2. Solipsism and egocentrismp. 275
17.3. Minimal objectivityp. 278
17.4. Psychopathyp. 292
17.5. Moral personality, habit, and reasonp. 300
18 Value-grounded rationalism (ii)p. 306
18.1. Consistency and universalizabilityp. 306
18.2. The first objection: consistency as a valuep. 313
18.3. The second objection: the gap between belief and actionp. 315
18.4. The third objection: the instrumental interpretationp. 316
VII Teleological and Deontological Justificationp. 319
19 Public justificationp. 319
19.1. Moral personality and justificationp. 319
19.2. Public morality and justificationp. 322
19.3. Contractualismp. 328
20 Constrained teleologyp. 329
20.1. Contractualism and teleologyp. 329
20.2. The common goodp. 334
21 Common good argumentsp. 336
21.1. Community of valuingp. 337
21.2. Harmonyp. 339
21.3. Compromisep. 343
21.4. Proceduralismp. 351
21.5. Neutrality and common good argumentsp. 356
22 Value and deontologyp. 359
22.1. The problem of circularityp. 359
22.2. Deontological public justificationp. 362
22.3. The rational commitment to both forms of justificationp. 365
23 Two remaining issuesp. 367
23.1. The boundary of the publicp. 367
23.2. Moral valuep. 376
VIII The State of Naturep. 379
24 The right to natural libertyp. 379
24.1. Deontology and the state of naturep. 379
24.2. The justification of natural libertyp. 381
24.3. Two objectionsp. 386
24.4. On interpreting "liberty"p. 390
25 Paternalismp. 396
25.1. Paternalism and libertyp. 396
25.2. Is paternalism always justified?p. 399
26 On further describing the state of naturep. 404
26.1. Moral and political philosophyp. 404
26.2. Propertyp. 407
26.3. Exchangep. 416
26.4. Harmp. 420
26.5. Needsp. 423
IX The Social Contractp. 429
27 The state of nature and the social contractp. 429
27.1. Irrational valuesp. 429
27.2. Immoral proposalsp. 431
27.3. The state of nature as a baselinep. 437
28 Ideology and compromisep. 439
28.1. Competing ideologiesp. 439
28.2. The contractual argument in one-dimensional political spacep. 443
28.3. The N-dimensional contractual argumentp. 457
28.4. Equal liberty and antiliberal ideologiesp. 466
28.5. Distributive justicep. 470
29 Concluding remarksp. 476
29.1. A prolegomenon to political philosophyp. 476
29.2. The limits of justificationp. 478
29.3. Morality and value in a liberal societyp. 480
Appendix A Izard's Des Categories and Some Reliability Statisticsp. 484
Appendix B Desert and Valuep. 485
Bibliographyp. 490
Indexp. 517